A model of a small open economy in which agents trade in local goods markets and an economy-wide asset market is developed. Purchasing-power parity is assumed to hold at the aggregate level. However, because of local deviations from purchasing-power parity, agents possess differential information. Using this framework, it is shown that when the exchange rate is flexible monetary policy can influence the distribution of real output by altering the information content of the exchange rate. However, when monetary policy is committed to fixing the exchange rate (by a feedback rule) the distribution of real output is independent of the particular exchange rate rule chosen. The stability of real output under the two regimes is compared, and it is demonstrated that regardless of the stability of domestic monetary policy a flexible exchange rate regime is superior in this respect. Possible qualifications and extensions of these results are also discussed. 
about its full current information value, regardless of the wisdom or discipline with which monetary policy is conducted.
I. The Model
The country under consideration is assumed to be a small open economy. One good is produced and consumed by domestic agents who are located in spatially separated markets indexed by the letter z; there is no trade in goods across markets at a point in time. The distinguishing characteristic of each market is its choice of a foreign trading partner at the start of each period. Because different domestic markets have different foreign trading partners, commodity prices differ from market to market as specified below. However, at the aggregate level purchasing-power parity holds-deviations from purchasing-power parity are strictly localized and uncorrelated over time. The only assets domestic agents are assumed to hold are domestic money and foreign bonds. Asset markets are integrated so that agents in all markets observe the nominal interest rate on foreign bonds, i*, and the (natural logarithm of the) exchange rate, St, defined as the price of foreign exchange in terms of domestic currency. Agents in market z also know (the natural logarithm of) their local commodity prices measured in home and foreign currencies, Pt(z) and P*(z).
The formal structure of the model is summarized by the following (all variables are in natural logarithms except for i* and it, which are in levels): P,(z) = St + P (Z),
P* (Z) = P* + Zt, 
= P1 ? Hyt -Xi,+ Wt.
Expression (1) is a goods-market arbitrage condition for market z. As shown by (2), goods prices in the local community's foreign trading partner, P*(z), deviate from the economy-wide average foreign price, P*, by an amount z,, where zt -N(O, os). Foreign prices differ across markets because the foreign country is also assumed to consist of a set of local markets. Since the home country is small, domestic agents take foreign prices and their distribution as given. If (1) and (2) are combined, it can be seen that Pt(z) = St + P* + z,, which implies that the economy-wide average of local commodity prices (the price level) is P, = St + P*. Therefore, purchasing-power parity holds at the aggregate level, but there are local deviations reflected by z, As shown by (3), it is assumed for simplicity that the stochastic structure of the foreign economy is such that the economy-wide average foreign price follows a random walk with vt -N(O, u7 .
The local commodity supply function (4) captures the intertemporal aspects of the model. An increase in the real rate of return, or relative price of current goods in terms of future goods, perceived by agents in market z, rt(z), causes them to substitute future for current leisure and thus results in an increase in current real output, yt(z). The relative price term can be explained as follows: a sale this period allows agents to accumulate P*(z) plus the nominal rate of return on foreign bonds by period t + 1, while a sale next period is expected to yield EzPt*+ I, which is the expected future foreign price conditioned on the information available to agents in market z. Comparison of these yields results in the relative price term Pt (z) -EzPt+ 1 + i*. Real output is also influenced by an aggregate supply shock, ut, which is normally and independently distributed with mean zero and variance
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The aggregate demand for money, Md, is given by (5) and depends on the economy-wide average levels of local prices, real output, and the perceived opportunity cost of holding money, which are given by Pt, yt, and i1. In addition, there is also an aggregate money demand shock, w, -N(O, uS). This specification follows from the fact that asset markets are integrated and can be viewed as having been obtained by averaging local money demand functions of the same form across markets. The opportunity cost of holding money as perceived by agents in market z is the forgone interest earnings on the foreign bond plus the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency, EZSt+ 1 -St. Averaging this opportunity cost across markets implies that it = i* + (EzS+I -St),
where EZS+ 1 is the economy-wide average of local expectations concerning the future exchange rate, EzSt+ 1.
II. Flexible Exchange Rates and Full Current Information
Under a flexible exchange rate regime the domestic money supply is a policy variable that is determined by the monetary authorities, and the exchange rate adjusts to maintain asset market equilibrium. In this and the following section the money supply, Mt, is assumed to be governed by the rule Mt = Mt -+ mt + Ivt
where t+ is a policy parameter chosen by the monetary authorities, and the nonsystematic element of monetary policy, Mt, is assumed normally and independently distributed with mean zero and variance Oj2n. The policy rule (7) can easily be altered to allow for a response to other lagged shocks without affecting any of the paper's qualitative conclusions.
A. Solution Technique
The most straightforward way to solve for the equilibrium under flexible exchange rates is to aggregate and then use the method of undetermined coefficients to solve for the equilibrium exchange rate. Substitution of (1)-(3) into the relative price term, rj(z), yields rt(z) = i* + zt + (v, -Ezvt).
Using (8) 
where EZvt is the economy-wide average of Ezvt. Applying the method of undetermined coefficients amounts to "guessing" a solution for the equilibrium exchange rate of the form2 St = IT( + TrjM/_ 1 + imP*-1 ?+ r3Vt-1
+ womb + IT5Vt + rr6ut + IT7Wt.
The assumption of rational expectations requires that the expected future exchange rate be found by updating (10) one period and taking expectations conditional on all available information (which depends on the market in which an agent is currently located). With (7) and (9) this procedure yields 
Finally, the T coefficients can be found from (9), (10), and the economy-wide average of (1 1).
B. Equilibrium with Full Current Information
When agents possess full current information, Ezmt = mt and Evt= Vt. From ( and-*7 = -1/(1 + X).
Regarding the real equilibrium of the economy, it can be seen from (8) that under full current information the real rate of return perceived by agents in market z is ft(z) = i* + zt.
With this in (4), it follows that the full current information level of real output in market z is Yt(Z) = at(i* + Zt) + at.
As can be seen from this expression, a positive value of z, causes agents in market z to increase their real output relative to the aggregate level, yt = uz* + ut. The reason for this is that agents in market z are aware that the real rate of return in their market is unusually high, and in order to take advantage of this opportunity they substitute future for current leisure. This expansion in current labor supply results in an increase in real output in market z.
III. Flexible Exchange Rates and Incomplete Information
In the previous section the benchmark case of full current information was considered. In this section it is assumed that agents must use the market prices they observe to make inferences about the state of the economy. These prices will not, in general, perfectly reveal the state of the economy, and agents will thus have to make their supply and demand decisions on the basis of incomplete information. Equations (8)-(1 1) of Section IIA continue to hold in this instance. The main difference is that in solving the model Ezm, and Ezv, cannot simply be replaced by their actual values as under full current information.
A. Extracting Information from Prices
In the model employed here agents observe four market prices-the nominal interest rate on foreign bonds and the exchange rate, both economy-wide prices, and their own local commodity prices, Pt(z) and P*(z). Only two of these prices, the exchange rate and the local foreign currency commodity price, are useful to agents in their attempt to assess current economic conditions. This follows from the fact that, in the interest of parsimony, the nominal interest rate on foreign bonds is assumed to be uncorrelated with any contemporaneous shocks and that Pt(z) is redundant given the arbitrage condition
(1).3
The problem confronting agents is to use the information at their disposal to form conditional expectations of the current shocks. Equation (10) indicates that the information content of the exchange rate is 1T4mt + r5Vrt + Tr6Ut + IT7wt, and from (2) and (3) it follows that the information content of P*(z) is Vt + zt. From (11) it can be seen that a solution to the model requires explicit calculation of Ezmt and Ezvt only. These expectations are given by 
B. Equilibrium with Incomplete Information
The first step in providing a complete solution to the model would be to use the method of undetermined coefficients to solve for the It's, 0's, and it's. However, this paper is concerned primarily with the behavior of real variables, and it turns out that quite a few conclusions can be drawn without solving explicitly for these coefficients. (17) and (18), increases in the economy-wide component of the foreign price shock, vt, raise real output relative to its full current information value, while increases in the local component, zt, reduce real output relative to its full current information value. That is, real output responds "too much" to aggregate shocks and "not enough" to local (or relative) shocks. The reason for this is that whenever a posiin the expressions for Tr4, Tr5, 7rr6, and XT7. The solutions for these coefficients will then be implicit in the resulting polynomial equations. However, few insights can be gained from this tedious exercise, the results of which are available from the author on request. This difficulty is a general feature of macroeconomic models with differential information such as the one presented here (see, e.g., Barro 1980; King 1982 
+ {XEzmt + [ot + X(q, -1)]Ezvt.
Since St' is known to all agents from their knowledge of the economy's past history, the right-hand side of (19) describes the new information conveyed to agents by the current exchange rate. This new information has two distinct components: the first concerns the combination of aggregate shocks Mt -(1 + '1xt)v, -4ut -wt, and the second market expectations as reflected by the term XEzmt + [got + X(q, -1)]Ezv,. If agents in different markets are differentially informed they will not know the market expectations component of (19), and because of this noise they will form different expectations of the aggreAggregate demand for this economy will have the same form as the aggregate supply function obtained by averaging (4) across all markets, except that it will be inversely related to the perceived real rate of return. Therefore, under flexible exchange rates the trade account will respond "too much" to aggregate shocks-the capital account will behave similarly (since the two must add to zero). Furthermore, the model predicts that the trade-account surplus will be positively correlated with real output over the business cycle. Under fixed exchange rates similar results hold for the trade balance, but its movements need not be mirrored by the capital account because of fluctuations in the balance of payments. These remarks assume that wealth effects are small. See Stockman and Koh (1982) for a discussion that includes wealth effects. gate shocks component, mt-(1 + o)vtut -wt. Monetary policy can alter the distribution of market expectations through its impact on the information content of the exchange rate, which arises because the policy parameter ip enters the second term of (19). The policy parameter ti enters (19) and thus influences the information content of the exchange rate, both directly and indirectly, through its effect on the endogenous expectations Ezmt and Ezvt. Because monetary policy can alter the information content of the exchange rate, it can influence the distribution of real output about its full current information value since this distribution depends on agents' forecast errors.6
In the case where there are no local deviations from purchasingpower parity, agents are not differentially informed and local and market expectations are identical (i.e., Ezmt = Ezmt, etc.). Therefore, monetary policy cannot alter the distribution of real output since all agents know market expectations and can thus reduce the information content of the exchange rate to its aggregate shocks component, mt -(1 + aot)vt -Put -wt, which is independent of the policy parameter 4,.7 However, agents still have incomplete information since they cannot accurately predict the four remaining shocks (mt, Ut, vt, and wt) from the knowledge of the exchange rate and local foreign currency prices, P*(z). This means that monetary policy does not attain potency simply because agents lack full current information. On the other hand, when local deviations from purchasing-power parity are present, monetary policy is able to influence the distribution of real output. But in this case, agents not only have incomplete information-they also have differential information because, as shown by (14) and (15), the market in which they are currently located colors their view of the state of the economy. The upshot is that monetary policy is able to influence the distribution of real output only to the extent that agents transacting in a common market have incomplete and differential information.
Finally, to see that monetary policy gains its leverage because of its ability to alter the information content of the exchange rate, not of local prices, note that the recursive projection formula implies that 
6 If, the policy rule (7) were extended to include other lagged shocks, the policy parameters attached to them would also influence the distribution of real output. Flood and Hodrick (1982) have shown that feedback on the current exchange rate is irrelevant for the distribution of real output, since it is observed by private agents.
7 When there are no local deviations from purchasing-power parity y,(z) = 5,(z) in the setup adopted here since knowledge of P, (z) fully reveals v,. If' foreign prices were subject to both permanent and transitory shocks this extreme result would not hold. Since the first term of (20) is, therefore, independent of the money supply rule, it follows that monetary policy influences agents' prediction errors, and hence the distribution of real output, because of its ability to influence the information content of the exchange rate as reflected by the second term of (20). This has important implications for the comparison of the variance of real output under fixed and flexible exchange rates that is taken up in Section V. Before turning to this issue, however, the next section will consider the case of a fixed exchange rate regime.
IV. Fixed Exchange Rates
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, which here means any system in which the exchange rate is set by a feedback rule, the monetary authorities sacrifice control of the money supply in order to manipulate the exchange rate. For simplicity, it is assumed that the monetary authorities set the exchange rate according to the rule
where p is a policy parameter reflecting the extent to which exchange rate changes are used to offset (p < 0) or reinforce the price-level effects of past foreign price shocks. This particular rule has been chosen to parallel the money supply rule (7) that was used in the discussion of flexible exchange rates.8 The rule can easily be generalized to allow for a policy response to other lagged shocks without altering any of the conclusions of this section. Because the monetary authorities are committed to buy and sell foreign exchange in order to support the exchange rate rule (22), movements in the money supply replace the exchange rate as the mechanism that equilibrates the asset market. From (22) it can be seen that EzSt+ 1 = St + pEzvt, and with this and (22) in the asset market equilibrium condition (9), it can be shown that the money supply must satisfy the condition Mt = St11 + pVt-1 + P* + (1 + 4cv)vt + cut + Wt
-(X -ta) * -(0a + Ap)Ezv. Equation (23) can be used to solve for the equilibrium money supply under full current information and incomplete information. However, as before, this is not done explicitly at this point, since it is the behavior of real rather than nominal variables that is of primary concern. As in the flexible exchange rate case, it is still true that deviations of real variables from their full current information values arise only to the extent that agents make errors in predicting economy-wide foreign price shocks. Therefore, in the case of incomplete information, (16) and (17) continue to hold under fixed exchange rates. To solve for the real equilibrium of the model under incomplete information and a fixed exchange rate, an expression for Ezv, is needed. As before, the recursive projection formula implies that this expectation is given by (20). However, since the exchange rate is determined by the feedback rule (22), it follows that St S" and that the second term in (20) is identically zero. Therefore, under a fixed exchange rate regime the conditional expectation of the economy-wide foreign price shock held by agents in market z is given by (21). Substitution of (21) into (16) 
As in the flexible exchange rate case, real output responds "too much" to aggregate foreign price shocks and "not enough" to local shocks. The major implication of (24) is that the exchange rate rule does not affect the distribution of real output even though agents have incomplete and differential information.9 The reason for this is that when the exchange rate is a policy variable determined by a feedback rule, the monetary authorities cannot influence its information content. Only to the extent that the exchange rate responds to current conditions, as it does under a flexible exchange rate regime, can policy rules possibly influence the distribution of real output. Fixing the exchange rate by a feedback rule robs the exchange rate of its information content and, for better or worse, deprives the monetary authorities of any power they might otherwise have had to affect the distribution of real output. (20) is given by (21). However, under a fixed exchange rate the second term in (20) is zero, while under flexible exchange rates it is not. This reflects the fact that when the exchange rate is flexible it conveys useful information, but when it is fixed by a feedback rule it does not. Therefore, because a flexible exchange rate provides agents with more information than does a fixed exchange rate, and since more information always improves (or at least does not worsen) forelo The ability of monetary policy to influence the distribution of real output in the model presented here is in contrast to results derived by Kimbrough (1983a) . The difference arises because it is assumed there that all agents possess the same information and hence no differential information exists for policymakers to exploit. " Flood and Hodrick (1982) reach the same conclusion for similar reasons using a different model. casting accuracy, it follows that adoption of' a flexible exchange rate will result in a smaller variance of real output about its full current information value. in the model presented here, this is true except in the limiting case where the variance of the new information contained in the exchange rate conditional on the information conveyed by the local foreign price, var [St -SIP*(z)], approaches infinity, since observing a totally noisy signal provides no information at all. This could be the case if, for instance, the monetary authorities refuse to follow the systematic part of their policy rule very closely and cr,2 -> x. In this case, the variance of real output is the same under the two regimes. Hence one cannot argue that a fixed exchange rate is to be preferred on the grounds that it "disciplines" monetary policy by committing the monetary authorities to peg the exchange rate. Regardless of the wisdom (in the sense of making judicious choices of policy parameters such as 4i) or discipline with which monetary policy is conducted, for a small open economy the amplitude of the business cycle should be less with a flexible exchange rate than with a fixed exchange rate.12 This "superiority" of flexible exchange rates arises solely because of' the power of market-determined prices to convey useful information to rational agents-a power that is forfeited when policymakers attempt to fix the exchange rate by a feedback rule. It is important to note that the superiority of flexible exchange rates holds even though money demand shocks influence domestic prices under floating rates (via the exchange rate), while domestic prices are insulated from money demand shocks (of domestic origin) under fixed exchange rates. The reason that this is irrelevant for the relative stability of real output under the two regimes is that a small country takes the real rate of' return, rt(z), which matters for output decisions as given. That is, while the two regimes differ in terms of the impact of' domestic money demand shocks on nominal prices, intertemporal relative prices in a small country are insulated from domestic money demand shocks under both regimes.
B. Qualifications and Extensions
There appear to be five important qualifications and possible extensions of the results presented in this paper. These qualifications and extensions take three basic forms-altering the information set, 12 Of course, wisdom and discipline in the conduct of monetary policy are desirable; the argument here is not to the contrary. The claim is that a small open economy can reduce the amplitude of its business cycle by adopting a flexible exchange rate. Then, having adopted a flexible exchange rate, policyrnakers can concern themselves with finding the optimal money supply rule. In the context of the model presented here this involves choosing the values for 4 and ar2 that minimize the variance of real output about its full current information value. changing the specification of the local commodity supply function, and respecifying or extending the markets in which agents are assumed to transact.
The first qualification concerns the information set agents possess. The main extension in this regard is that agents could be assumed to observe monetary aggregates contemporaneously, rather than with a lag as in the present setup. This information could be either exact or noisy, as in King (1981) . In either case, the results would be modified in two ways. First, exchange rate policy would be able to affect the distribution of real output by altering the information content of the observed monetary aggregate. This issue is taken up by Kimbrough (1983b) . Second, the "superiority" of a flexible exchange rate regime would be called into question because, although it is still true that the information content of the exchange rate is nil under a fixed exchange rate regime, the information conveyed by observing monetary aggregates might be enough to offset this disadvantage.'3 One difficulty with this extension, as noted by King (1981) , is that if' agents observe monetary aggregates contemporaneously, then an econometrician with data on these aggregates should find them to be uncorrelated with real output. However, empirical evidence clearly supports the existence of a positive correlation between money and real output over the course of the business cycle. This extension must, therefore, be reconciled with the empirical evidence before it can be accepted as valid. Another extension in the same spirit would be to assume that agents know their own money holdings, M,(z), rather than the aggregate money supply, M,. As shown in an appendix that is available on request, this can be viewed as a special case of noisy information about the aggregate money supply. However, it can also be shown that expanding the information set in this manner does not alter the paper's qualitative conclusions concerning the role of' monetary policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates and the "superiority" of flexible exchange rates. In fact, the availability of information about local money holdings actually strengthens the case for flexible exchange rates." 13 T o compare fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in this case simulation methods would be needed to (i) find optimal money supply and exchange rate rules and (ii) compare the stability of real output under the two regimes when the optimal rule is in force. The need for simLulation sterns from the fact that a closed-form solution to the model is not readily obtained analytically.
14 Under both fixed and flexible exchange rates, agents observe local foreign currency prices and economy-wide interest rates. Since local money holdings depend on these variables and since foreign prices and interest rates are not influenced by domestic shocks in the small country case, it follows that agents can reduce the information content of local money holdings to a combination of domestic shocks that is uncorrelated with foreign prices and interest rates. Therefore, under fixed exchange rates A second extension concerns adding a wealth term to the local commodity supply function along the lines of Barro (1980) . In this case, monetary discipline (as measured by us2 ) is an important factor in comparing exchange rate regimes (provided that wealth effects are not very weak). It can be shown, however, that as long as monetary policy under flexible exchange rates is not too undisciplined (i.e., as long as um is not too large), flexible exchange rates will be superior to fixed exchange rates in stabilizing real output. The results presented earlier can be viewed as being based on the assumption that wealth effects are weak, as reported by Lucas and Rapping (1969) .
Yet a third qualification concerns extensions of the model designed to make the country large in some markets. This could be done by making the country large in world markets (say small in its import market and large in its export market) or by introducing into the model nontraded goods or assets that are traded economy wide. With these modifications, exchange rate policy could influence the distribution of real output by altering the information content of an endogenous price other than the exchange rate, so long as that price is observed by all agents. In addition, no unambiguous conclusion regarding the amplitude of the business cycle under fixed and flexible exchange rates would emerge in this case. This result is due to differences in the stochastic structure of the economy under the two regimes, as shown by Kimbrough (1 983a). These qualifications serve to highlight the crucial role played by parity conditions in deriving the results presented earlier.
A fourth qualification concerns private indexing based on either local commodity prices or the exchange rate. As shown by King (1982) , such indexing schemes are comparable to monetary policy in that they can affect the distribution of real output through their influence on the information content of' market prices. Introducing such an indexing scheme into the present setup would have policy implications along the lines suggested by King (1982) . However, the superiority of a flexible exchange rate in terms of stabilizing real output would remain intact, since it would still be true that the exchange rate conveys useful information when it is flexible but not when it is fixed.
Finally, it should be noted that the model presented here does not the information provided by local money holdings will not help agents to forecast zJ. However, under flexible exchange rates agents have two bits of' information, local foreign prices and the exchange rate, that are useful in fOrming forecasts of' 1,, and the exchange rate is contaminated by various domestic shocks. Hence the availability of' local money supply information will improve agents' forecasts of v, because they can use the knowledge about domestic shocks it provides to "sharpen" the information about the aggregate foreign price shock, vt, conveyed to them by the exchange rate.
include a forward market in foreign exchange. In Kimbrough (1982) the model is extended in this direction. There, it is shown that the properties of the forward rate as a predictor of the future spot rate are a crucial determinant of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policies and of the relative stability of real output under fixed and flexible exchange rates. The omission of a forward market in the present model can be viewed in one of three ways. First, it can be viewed as an assumption that for the currency of the country in question no such market exists, either because of legal or other institutional constraints or simply because the market is "too thin." Second, empirical evidence indicates that movements of spot and forward exchange rates are highly correlated (see Frenkel 1981 ). This suggests that spot and forward rates convey pretty much the same information. Therefore, as a practical matter, the omission of a forward market may not be too serious. Third, the model presented here can be viewed as making the extreme, but simplifying, assumption that the forward rate is a totally noisy signal and thus conveys no useful information (although empirical evidence would certainly contradict this assumption). Now that earlier results have been qualified in several respects, it is important to reassess them in the light of these qualifications. Regarding the role of monetary policy under flexible exchange rates, none of the qualifications just noted alters the conclusion that it can influence the distribution of real output so long as agents with incomplete and differential information trade in a common market. However, to the extent that other endogenous variables besides the exchange rate, be they prices or monetary aggregates, are observed by all agents, the conclusion that exchange rate policy is ineffective may no longer hold. Finally, the superiority of a flexible exchange rate in stabilizing real output is subject to some qualifications. However, for a country that is small in world goods markets and whose nontraded goods and assets are close substitutes for traded goods and assets, so that their prices are closely aligned with world prices, adopting a flexible exchange rate is likely to reduce the amplitude of the business cycle (if wealth effects are weak and/or monetary policy is disciplined). This result highlights the role of market-determined prices in facilitating the efficient allocation of scarce resources by conveying useful information to rational agents.
